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AbstractAirport systems adapted to the influx of Low-Cost Carriers (LCC) as the segment grew to prominence inthe European market during the last decades. The generalised perspective that LCCs are attached toremote secondary airports is being increasingly challenged by recent moves of the largest EuropeanLCC. The reality is that the impact of LCCs has spread to most commercial airports in Europe, primaryand secondary alike. Yet, despite valuable insights on the evolution of airline networks, existingliteratures lacks a clear understanding of why this has occurred. This paper explains the dynamics inthe evolution of airports systems that resulted in significant growth for the low-cost segment in Europe.A multiple case study involving 42 European airports provides evidence to identify the mechanisms thattrigger the traffic patterns leading to the ascendency of LCCs in their respective airport systems.Understanding these mechanisms may probe valuable for airport strategic planning.
Highlights
• LCCs in Europe have significantly impacted both major and secondary airports
• New infrastructure encourages the growth of LCCs, even if not directly aimed at LCCs
• Market dynamics led many European airports to focus on LCC traffic
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21 IntroductionLiberalisation of the air transport market around the world has profoundly changed the evolutiontrends of the aviation industry. A liberalised market created a proper environment for Low-Cost Carriers(LCC) to emerge and favoured their rapid expansion. Yet after decades of liberalisation the academicliterature is not conclusive on the long-term impact of this trend for airports (A. Graham, 2013). Thereis concern about the growing market power of LCCs and its implications for airports, and there isuncertainty about the future evolution of the business models, not only for LCCs but for traditionalairlines too (European Parliament, 2007).An important body of literature links the emergence of LCCs to the availability of ‘secondary’ airportswhere they could thrive avoiding direct competition with other airlines (Barbot, 2006; de Neufville,2008; Dobruszkes, 2006, 2013; Francis, Fidato, & Humphreys, 2003; Francis, Humphreys, & Ison, 2004;Franke, 2004; Zhang, Hanaoka, Inamura, & Ishikura, 2008). This aspect has been studied as a trigger forcompetition between airports (Jimenez, Claro, & Pinho de Sousa, 2013; Pels, Njegovan, & Behrens, 2009)a factor for airport efficiency (Martini, Manello, & Scotti, 2013), and as a potential asset to increasenetwork connectivity (Malighetti, Paleari, & Redondi, 2008). Yet recent developments in Europe showthat primary airports are in the core of LCC expansion and that the implication of this trend for smallersecondary airports remain unclear (Dobruszkes, Givoni, & Vowles, 2017).In order to understand such implications, it is necessary to understand first how LCCs start, expand orabandon service at a given airport and how other airlines and airports react. And that needs to beassessed over time to gain a clearer picture of foreseeable trends. To the best of our knowledge, existingliterature (covered in the next section) describes extensively what has happened to the low-costsegment over time, but still lacks a clear understanding on how the current landscape formed. Gaininginsights on such details may be valuable for airport planners and policy makers to discern possibleoutcomes of the current trends.In that sense, this papers proposes a dynamic perspective to study the evolution of European airportsystems regarding LCC influence. Given that 16 of the top 20 European airports with the largest amountof seats provided by LCCs in 2013 belonged to a Multi-Airport System (MAS), we examined the evolutionat 42 airports (all the airports in each MAS plus the four single-airport systems) between 2004 and2013.. Over this period LCCs became major players at both primary and secondary airports in Europe,contrary to the generalised notion that LCCs are attached to remote secondary airports.We considered two types of dynamics in the evolution of the airport systems: infrastructure-related andmarket-related dynamics. The interaction of different dynamics result in particular traffic patterns withcommonalities that are recognisable among diverse airport systems. By understanding such dynamics,airport managers may improve their planning processes considering both infrastructure developmentand strategy formulation simultaneously.
3The paper is structured in six sections. After this introduction, the second section reviews relevantliterature and defines the gaps that this research addresses. Section 3 describes the methodology usedfor the research. Section 4 summarises the most relevant findings from the traffic evolution at theairports selected for the study. Section 5 introduces the mechanisms that produce generic trafficpatterns extracted from the multiple case studies. And section 6 presents the main findings andimplications for policy making.
2 The impact of LCCs on airport systemsAirports are systems in the sense that they do not operate independently (de Neufville & Odoni, 2003);they are part of networks in which decisions made in one airport can affect others. This is more evidentwhen different airports serve the same region, i.e., when they are part of Multi-Airport Systems (MAS).In an MAS airports compete with each other for traffic and services (Copenhagen Economics, 2012; deNeufville & Odoni, 2003; Jimenez et al., 2013; Pels et al., 2009) generating complex dynamics forplanning and operations (de Neufville, 1995a, 1995b). Bonnefoy (2008) studied some of those dynamicsto determine how airport systems can be scaled by developing into an MAS along time.Over the last decades LCCs have disrupted airport systems, particularly in North America and Europe(de Neufville, 2008). The impact that LCCs have on airports have been ample matter of research, yet “theacademic literature is far less clear and conclusive about the overall impacts of LCC operations atairports and the extent to which airports benefit from LCCs, particularly in the long-term, and thissuggests that more studies are needed” (A. Graham, 2013). Indeed, many studies have focused onspecific airports within a limited time frame, or on the airlines (Barret, 2004; European Parliament,2007; Francis et al., 2003, 2004; Gillen & Lall, 2004; B. Graham & Shaw, 2008; Malighetti, Paleari, &Redondi, 2009; Malighetti, Redondi, Martini, & Paleari, 2007; Martini et al., 2013).Consequently, it is commonly agreed that LCCs prefer 'secondary' airports (Barbot, 2006; de Neufville,2008; Dobruszkes, 2006, 2013; Zhang et al., 2008). However Abda et al. (2012) found that, in the USA,the market shares of LCCs were bigger at the largest primary airports, “contrary to the commonperception that LCCs avoid primary airports and direct competition with the [Full Service Carriers]” (A.Graham, 2013). This indicates that LCCs are becoming increasingly dominant in some markets (inparticular the intra-USA and intra-European markets) and, as they keep growing, they move to theprimary airports. In fact, the recent evolution of the networks of LCCs in Europe (Dobruszkes, 2006,2009, 2013; Dobruszkes et al., 2017) suggests similar developments as the business models of theairlines evolve.The expansion of LCCs at larger primary airports poses interesting questions for practitioners andresearchers. How do these airports respond if their infrastructure has been normally developed for theuse of traditional airlines? What factors favour or hinder LCC growth at primary and secondary airports?Are LCCs abandoning secondary airports altogether? What are the implications of these issues for policy
4making?In order to contribute towards filling such gaps, this paper proposes a dynamic perspective to studyhow LCCs have affected the evolution of European airport systems. The main factors that guidedparticular paths of evolution in the airport systems may suggest insights for the future development asLCCs keep growing and legacy airlines compete more strongly. Understanding the dynamics of suchevolution is paramount to cope with the inherent volatility and uncertainty in airport systems, increasedby trends associated to LCCs.
3 MethodologyIn order to study the evolution of airport systems with special consideration for the low-cost segment,we selected the 20 European airports with the largest offer of low-cost seats in 2013, as per Innovatadata (IATA, n.d.). As most of them (16) belong to Multi-Airport Systems (MAS), we also included all theother airports in every relevant MAS to analyse their evolution and mutual influences. Hence, weperformed a multiple-case study comprising an extensive document review coupled with an analysis oftraffic trends for each of the 42 resulting airports (see Table) during the period between 2004 and 2013.The analysis of traffic trends is primarily based on airline capacity (available seats) data, from theInnovata database (IATA, n.d.) aggregated for the years 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2013. In the case ofSpanish airports we have also used data provided by AENA Aeropuertos, the airport operator, in termsof passengers per airline for every year between 2005 to 2013 (AENA, 2014). In the case of Britishairports, we complemented capacity information with passenger traffic data, aggregated at the airportlevel (i.e. not by carrier) between 1998 and 2013 (CAA, 2014).
The document review included public documents in different languages, mainly the periodic reports
of airport operators and civil aviation authorities, as well as their websites, aviation industry news
and analyses, and mainstream and local journals. Traffic trends were assessed using non-
hierarchical cluster analysis to group airports according to the relevance of low-cost traffic at the
start (2004) and end (2013) of the analysis period. A non-hierarchical approach using k-means
clustering (Forgy, 1965; Lloyd, 1982) based on euclidean quadratic distances was selected due to
the relatively small sample (the 42 airports were grouped in their respective 17 airport systems) and
the insights gained from the case studies that preliminarily hinted the possible number of clusters.
Results of the cluster analysis were evaluated using Dunn (Dunn, 1974; Rousseeuw, 1987) and
silhouette indexes. To select the appropriate number of clusters Dunn and silhouette indexes should
be high.










ALC Alicante (Elche) Alicante 16 SEN Southend London 116
MJV Murcia San Javier Alicante 111 STN Stansted London 3
AMS Schiphol Amsterdam 11 LBA Leeds Bradford Manchester 49
EIN Eindhoven Amsterdam 42 LPL Liverpool Manchester 30
RTM Rotterdam Amsterdam 108 MAN Manchester (Ringway) Manchester 6
BCN El Prat Barcelona 1 BGY Bergamo Milan 8
GRO Gerona Barcelona 48 LIN Linate Milan 134
REU Reus Barcelona 139 MXP Malpensa Milan 12
BRU Brussels Zaventem Brussels 85 OSL Oslo (Gardermoen) Oslo 5
CRL Charleroi Brussels 20 RYG Rygge Oslo 62
CPH Copenhagen (Kastrup) Copenhagen 17 TRF Torp (Sandefjord) Oslo 92
MMX Malmo Copenhagen 120 BVA Beauvais Paris 33
EDI Edinburgh Glasgow 18 CDG Charles de Gaulle Paris 26
GLA Glasgow Intl Glasgow 36 ORY Orly Paris 15
PIK Prestwick Glasgow 101 XCR Vatry Paris 292
IST Ataturk Istanbul 158 CIA Ciampino Rome 27
SAW Sabiha Gokcen Istanbul 4 FCO Fiumicino Rome 19
LCY London City London - AGP Malaga (Costa del Sol) - 10
LGW Gatwick London 2 DUB Dublin - 9
LHR Heathrow London 135 MAD Madrid Barajas - 14
LTN Luton London 7 PMI Palma de Mallorca - 13
In the document review we collected information regarding two types of dynamics in the evolution ofevery airport: infrastructure-related and market-related dynamics. Infrastructure-related dynamicsmostly focus on capacity expansion in the passenger buildings and the air-side facilities (runway systemand aprons); as well as in the redevelopment of existing airports or construction of new greenfieldairports. Market-related dynamics refer to external events affecting the aviation industry in a global orlocal context (such as the 2008 economic recession, or the opening of the Madrid – Barcelona High-Speed Rail line for airports in or near Madrid and Barcelona); management strategies (Malighetti et al.,2007) from the airports or airlines that affect their competitive position or their operations (such asmergers or acquisitions, change of strategic focus, creation of spin-off or start-up companies, openingor closing of bases or hubs); and vicissitudes that affect airline or airport operations (such asbankruptcies and legal disputes).The 42 airports were studied by MAS in order to allow for an analysis of the impacts that events in oneairport may have on the other airports of the MAS. Given the extent of the exercise, Annex A summarisesthe most relevant findings of the multiple-case study according to the type of dynamics examined forevery airport system. Likewise, the next section highlights the outcomes of the analysis of traffic
6evolution at the airports under study. Traffic evolution, besides the analysis shown in the next section,was examined on a carrier-by-carrier basis for each airport system over the period of analysis. Suchdetails, however, are too extensive to be reproduced in this paper. Interested readers are referred to(Jimenez, 2015) for more information.
4 Traffic evolution at European airport systemsTable 2 shows traffic evolution at the 42 airports by MAS and type of airline (Non-LCC and LCC) between2004 and 2013. Cell colours show the trends in growing or declining traffic for every segment in eachMAS: Dark green backgrounds signal a large number of Non-LCC traffic (relative to the MAS) whilst darkorange signals a large number of LCC seats (also relative to the MAS). In every airport system low-costtraffic grew considerably from the levels of 2004. Yet in most cases of Multi-Airport Systems, low-costtraffic grew more significantly at the primary airports, to the point that the primary1 airports had thelargest share of LCC traffic in every MAS by 2013 as Table illustrates. Moreover, the prominent growthof LCCs made Brussels Charleroi (CRL) and Milan Bergamo (BGY) airports transition from secondary toprimary airports in their respective MAS according to the definition set by Bonnefoy (2008).Some airports had a clear change in focus as low-cost traffic filled the void of fewer legacy traffic,whether as an intended strategy where LCCs were actively promoted by airport management, as in thecase of London Gatwick (LGW); or unintended as a result of the interaction of the different dynamicssummarised in Annex A and described in more detail in the next section, as in the cases of Barcelona ElPrat (BCN), Malaga (AGP), Alicante (ALC), Milan Malpensa (MXP), Edinburgh (EDI), and to a lesser extentMadrid (MAD), Palma de Mayorca (PMI), Rome Fiumicino (FCO), Copenhagen (CPH) and Paris Orly(ORY).In Multi-Airport Systems the smaller airports usually provide less room for expansion, hence it wasmore common that low-cost traffic moved from secondary to primary airports in the MAS. Thishappened especially when there was capacity available at the primary airport even when such capacitywas not intentionally built for LCCs. Table and Table show this evolution clearly for the MAS in Alicanteand Barcelona. There were also cases in which primary airports provided sufficient capacity for LCCs tocapture demand growth that was more difficult for FSCs to stimulate, as in Amsterdam (AMS), ParisCharles de Gaulle (CDG), Oslo (OSL) and Glasgow (GLA).Secondary airports have played an important role in fostering the growth of LCCs, particularly in theinitial phases that made the low-cost business model viable at large scale. Although in most casessecondary airports cannot provide the same levels of capacity than primary airports, some secondaryairports were able to secure prime positions for low-cost traffic within their MAS. As pointed out aboveMilan Bergamo (BGY) and Brussels Charleroi (CRL) stand out in this regard, along with Paris Beauvais
1 Bonnefoy (2008) considers primary airports those that handle over 20% of total traffic in a Multi-Airport System
(secondary airports thus handle 20% or less). In the case of systems with a single airport that is naturally considered
a primary one.
7(BVA) and Rome Ciampino (CIA) to a lesser extent. Ciampino, however, is in fact a former primaryairport that was able to attract low-cost traffic when all airlines moved to the then new primary airportin the MAS (Fiumicino – FCO).







2004 2008 2012 2013 2004 2008 2012 2013
ALC
Alicante
2.167 2.525 1.316 1.391 1.525 3.241 3.701 4.265 P
MJV 92 146 76 59 403 1.012 606 618 S
AMS
Amsterdam
24.183 25.505 25.080 25.583 1.707 3.586 4.772 4.935 P
EIN 174 41 25 6 161 844 1.777 2.029 S
RTM 664 200 123 304 0 475 573 666 S
BCN
Barcelona
15.830 13.599 9.424 8.113 1.703 8.051 13.745 13.815 P
GRO 66 116 40 33 1.501 3.337 1.813 1.807 S
REU 20 197 159 134 242 428 375 445 S
BRU
Brussels
9.087 11.816 11.126 11.199 1.302 1.072 1.073 1.041 P
CRL 25 24 328 396 1.258 1.750 3.765 3.832 P
CPH
Copenhagen
13.370 14.253 11.929 11.904 922 701 3.183 3.961 P
MMX 731 813 696 769 161 129 537 561 S
EDI
Glasgow
3.108 2.655 2.228 2.434 2.106 3.351 3.686 3.890 P
GLA 2.975 2.704 2.250 2.318 1.370 2.412 2.207 2.325 P
PIK 11 12 0 0 1.110 1.654 703 756 S
IST
Istanbul
9.394 16.543 29.235 32.353 35 111 321 342 P
SAW 0 1.059 1.805 3.288 43 1.336 6.232 7.938 P
LCY
London
1.619 3.320 2.508 2.673 119 0 0 0 S
LGW 10.245 12.509 9.005 8.726 3.366 7.662 11.151 11.944 P
LHR 46.024 46.634 45.570 46.847 106 146 421 473 P
LTN 170 351 308 323 4.042 5.944 5.492 5.470 S
SEN 1 0 64 48 0 3 371 582 S
STN 1.029 1.408 428 360 11.239 12.913 10.266 10.528 S
LBA
Manchester
582 535 303 361 761 1.420 1.626 1.802 S
LPL 209 28 17 0 1.623 3.436 2.904 2.749 S
MAN 7.388 8.512 7.126 7.160 1.389 3.609 5.013 5.635 P
BGY
Milan
362 362 142 139 1.519 3.752 5.237 5.238 P
LIN 5.184 6.376 6.112 5.817 579 277 617 479 P
MXP 11.679 9.793 6.449 6.262 333 2.850 5.288 4.882 P
OSL
Oslo
9.054 10.041 9.277 9.645 1.830 3.791 5.748 6.319 P
RYG 0 13 45 35 0 292 1.243 1.384 S
TRF 458 388 451 476 299 700 788 916 S
BVA
Paris
7 66 8 51 853 1.637 2.455 2.476 S
CDG 34.609 36.888 35.113 34.784 1.228 3.024 3.007 2.928 P
ORY 14.938 14.633 13.634 13.841 1.527 3.094 3.982 4.267 P
XCR 0 0 11 10 0 0 49 56 S
CIA
Rome
146 23 0 0 1.482 2.926 2.868 2.926 S
FCO 18.756 23.086 20.089 19.242 972 1.839 4.138 3.841 P
AGP Malaga* 3.970 4.123 2.451 2.445 1.925 3.568 4.723 4.973 P
DUB Dublin* 6.434 8.204 7.381 7.809 3.576 6.954 4.965 5.083 P
MAD Madrid* 27.009 30.209 24.166 21.335 527 4.251 6.364 4.550 P
PMI Palma* 6.569 10.236 7.723 7.588 1.107 2.297 4.588 4.824 P
Notes: * Single-airport system. Dark green indicates large number of Non-LCC seats in relation to the MAS. Dark orange indicates
large number of LCC seats in relation to the MAS. Airport type according to Bonnefoy (2008) based on 2013 traffic: P = Primary (>
20% of MAS traffic), S = Secondary (<= 20% of MAS traffic).
8Interestingly, other airports that are usually considered as secondary within their MAS were actuallyintended to replace or extend capacity for legacy traffic in the cities they serve (London Stansted – STN– and Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen – SAW, for instance). As the expected traffic did not materialise, LCCs werebetter fit to use these facilities.
Table 3. Evolution of LCC market shares in each airport and MAS. Source: Innovata.
MAS
Proport ion of Available seats
Share of LCC traf fic in the airport Share of LCC traf fic in the MAS
2004 2008 2012 2013 2004 2008 2012 2013
ALC Alicante 41,3% 56,2% 73,8% 75,4% 79,1% 76,2% 85,9% 87,3%
P
MJV 81,4% 87,4% 88,9% 91,3% 20,9% 23,8% 14,1% 12,7% S
AMS
Amsterdam
6,6% 12,3% 16,0% 16,2% 91,4% 73,1% 67,0% 64,7% P
EIN 48,1% 95,4% 98,6% 99,7% 8,6% 17,2% 25,0% 26,6% S
RTM 0,0% 70,4% 82,3% 68,7% 0,0% 9,7% 8,0% 8,7% S
BCN
Barcelona
9,7% 37,2% 59,3% 63,0% 49,4% 68,1% 86,3% 86,0% P
GRO 95,8% 96,6% 97,8% 98,2% 43,6% 28,2% 11,4% 11,2% S
REU 92,4% 68,5% 70,2% 76,9% 7,0% 3,6% 2,4% 2,8% S
BRU Brussels 12,5% 8,3% 8,8% 8,5% 50,9% 38,0% 22,2% 21,4%
P
CRL 98,1% 98,6% 92,0% 90,6% 49,1% 62,0% 77,8% 78,6% P
CPH Copenhagen 6,5% 4,7% 21,1% 25,0% 85,1% 84,5% 85,6% 87,6%
P
MMX 18,0% 13,7% 43,6% 42,2% 14,9% 15,5% 14,4% 12,4% S
EDI
Glasgow
40,4% 55,8% 62,3% 61,5% 45,9% 45,2% 55,9% 55,8% P
GLA 31,5% 47,1% 49,5% 50,1% 29,9% 32,5% 33,5% 33,4% P
PIK 99,0% 99,3% 100,0% 100,0% 24,2% 22,3% 10,7% 10,8% S
IST Istanbul 0,4% 0,7% 1,1% 1,0% 44,9% 7,7% 4,9% 4,1%
P
SAW 100,0% 55,8% 77,5% 70,7% 55,1% 92,3% 95,1% 95,9% P
LCY
London
6,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% S
LGW 24,7% 38,0% 55,3% 57,8% 17,8% 28,7% 40,3% 41,2% P
LHR 0,2% 0,3% 0,9% 1,0% 0,6% 0,5% 1,5% 1,6% P
LTN 96,0% 94,4% 94,7% 94,4% 21,4% 22,3% 19,8% 18,9% S
SEN 0,0% 100,0% 85,3% 92,4% 0,0% 0,0% 1,3% 2,0% S
STN 91,6% 90,2% 96,0% 96,7% 59,6% 48,4% 37,1% 36,3% S
LBA
Manchester
56,7% 72,6% 84,3% 83,3% 20,2% 16,8% 17,0% 17,7% S
LPL 88,6% 99,2% 99,4% 100,0% 43,0% 40,6% 30,4% 27,0% S
MAN 15,8% 29,8% 41,3% 44,0% 36,8% 42,6% 52,5% 55,3% P
BGY
Milan
80,8% 91,2% 97,4% 97,4% 62,5% 54,5% 47,0% 49,4% P
LIN 10,0% 4,2% 9,2% 7,6% 23,8% 4,0% 5,5% 4,5% P
MXP 2,8% 22,5% 45,1% 43,8% 13,7% 41,4% 47,5% 46,1% P
OSL
Oslo
16,8% 27,4% 38,3% 39,6% 86,0% 79,3% 73,9% 73,3% P
RYG - 95,7% 96,5% 97,5% - 6,1% 16,0% 16,1% S
TRF 39,5% 64,3% 63,6% 65,8% 14,0% 14,6% 10,1% 10,6% S
BVA
Paris
99,2% 96,1% 99,7% 98,0% 23,6% 21,1% 25,9% 25,5% S
CDG 3,4% 7,6% 7,9% 7,8% 34,0% 39,0% 31,7% 30,1% P
ORY 9,3% 17,5% 22,6% 23,6% 42,3% 39,9% 41,9% 43,9% P
XCR - - 81,7% 84,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,5% 0,6% S
CIA Rome 91,0% 99,2% 100,0% 100,0% 60,4% 61,4% 40,9% 43,2%
S
FCO 4,9% 7,4% 17,1% 16,6% 39,6% 38,6% 59,1% 56,8% P
AGP Malaga* 32,7% 46,4% 65,8% 67,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% P
DUB Dublin* 35,7% 45,9% 40,2% 39,4% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% P
MAD Madrid* 1,9% 12,3% 20,8% 17,6% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% P





Notes: * Single-airport system. Dark orange indicates a high share of LCC seats in relat ion to the airport or the MAS. Airport type according to Bonnefoy
(2008) based on 2013 traf fic: P = Primary (> 20% of MAS traf fic), S = Secondary (<= 20% of MAS traf fic).
9These developments were contrasted with the results of the cluster analysis. In order to be able toreplicate the data available ( Table) and focus on the relative position of LCCs in each airport, weproduced seven input variables. Three of them were the same but on two different periods (2004 and2013): the market share of primary airports in the MAS, the market share of LCCs at primary airports inthe MAS, and the market share of LCCs at secondary airports in the MAS. The other variable was thetraffic (available seats) growth rate in each MAS between 2004 and 2013.Given that traffic growth at Istanbul MAS was extraordinary during the period of analysis (364%),compared to the rest of MAS, different combinations were tested for the cluster analysis. Several clusterswere produced considering all airports and not considering the growth variable, whilst varying thenumber of clusters; and again considering all variables and considering Istanbul as an outlier. Thesignificance of the results was first contrasted against the findings in the multiple-case study for all theairports and it was more satisfactory when Istanbul MAS was included. Then validity indexes to selectthe appropriate number of clusters where calculated for every alternative. As Table shows, four clustersdeliver the best performance for Dunn and silhouette indexes.
Table 4. Values of Dunn and Silhouette indexes to select number of clusters.




Table shows the airport systems included in each of the clusters selected. Based on the findings of themultiple-case study summarised in Annex A, Table also presents a qualitative description of eachcluster, as well as the mechanisms of low-cost traffic evolution that were deduced from the mixedquantitative/qualitative approach. The mechanisms are further detailed in the next section.
Table 5: Clusters of airport systems according to low-cost traffic evolution.
Cluster MAS Description Mechanisms
1 Alicante MAS where primary airport(s) reacted to LCC growth in
secondary airport(s) and developed a stronger position in
the MAS due to fostering low-cost growth mainly through






MAS where where secondary airport(s) gained and
sustained a strong position in the MAS due to fostering
low-cost growth. Primary airport(s) reacted by allowing








3 Amsterdam MAS where primary airport allowed (but not
straightforward fostered) LCC growth focused on more




4 Malaga Single-Airport Systems subject to strong market dynamics
that jeopardised the position of the major FSC users and
LCCs replaced legacy carriers and captured growth using






I1 – Capacity expansion at primary airports
I2 – New/emerged primary airport
I3 – New/emerged secondary airport
M1 – Market dynamics
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5 Mechanisms of low-cost traffic evolution at European airportsDespite the particular characteristics that make every case unique, we used the 42 case studies toidentify four generic mechanisms that trigger distinctive patterns of traffic evolution. Three of themrelate to infrastructure dynamics: i) Capacity expansion at primary airports, ii) new/emerged primaryairports, and iii) new/emerged secondary airports2. The fourth mechanism is directly related to themarket dynamics occurring in the airport system. The mechanisms normally occurred in a combinationof infrastructure plus market dynamics to produce a given outcome or traffic pattern.
5.1 Capacity expansion at primary airports (I1)The first mechanism relates to the implementation of a major capacity expansion at a primary (or at theonly) airport in the system. In this case low-cost traffic is typically promoted because the airport isunable to attract the foreseen growth in non-LCC traffic that had justified the expansion (see Fig. 1).Given that additional capacity is deployed in discrete amounts, some airports invest in large expansions,based on long-term forecasts that are highly uncertain.
Fig. 1. Typical traffic patterns at a primary airport before and after considerable capacity expansion.
When investments are realised (typically 2 to 6 years after construction started depending on the scaleof the project, and 5 to 15 years after planning – i.e. forecasting – started) external conditions that affectdemand are different (as in the case of Spanish airports in which most major expansions opened amideconomic recession). If expected demand does not occur, unused facilities with high fixed costs becomea burden for the airport operator. LCCs (and in particular the largest European LCCs) have large fleetsthat can be deployed quickly and flexibly to stimulate demand with low fares and occupy the new space.This pattern is more visible when capacity was added by building new separate passenger buildings.The old ones either close or attract LCCs.If demand for traditional airlines effectively grow but not at the expected rate, the marginal cost ofproviding capacity for LCCs is much lower than before the expansion, when the airport was morecongested. In this case LCCs can also thrive at the airport by exploring new markets with higher yields.
2 New secondary airports may become primary (as per Bonnefoy, 2008) if they concentrate enough traffic growth, as
in the case of Brussels Charleroi (CRL) and Miilan Bergamo (BGY).
11
5.2 New/emerged primary airports (I2)The second mechanism involves the emergence of a new primary airport in the region, not necessarilya greenfield project as major redevelopment of former facilities can also be considered. When, in a givenairport system, a new primary airport is built (or an existing airport is extensively redeveloped tobecome a primary airport), there are typically two patterns of evolution according to whether thenew/emerged airport is able to capture traffic or not (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Typical traffic patterns when a new or redeveloped primary airport emerge.In the first case (Fig. 2 left) the new airport opens, the old one is not closed, and its traffic is not forcedto transfer to the new location. As traffic does not materialise in the new facilities, the airport operatorneeds to increase revenues to balance high fixed costs and LCCs become a natural option for the airportto foster growth. In the meantime, capacity at the original primary airport may be increased to copewith congestion. Eventually, some LCCs may operate from the original primary airport as well, especiallythrough acquisitions or mergers, whilst some non-LCC carriers may also use the new/emerged airport,especially foreign FSCs or charters.London Stansted (STN) and Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (SAW) are the best examples of this pattern. Builtto alleviate congestion in other primary airports, STN and SAW only grew to prominence when LCCsstarted regular services.In the second case (Fig. 2 right) traffic is transferred from the original primary airport to the newdevelopment, but the old airport is not dismantled. Eventually, low-cost traffic may develop almostexclusively in the original primary airport (which can become a secondary one if traffic at the newprimary grows considerably) but limited to the available capacity. When capacity is reached, the airportis not expanded (usually there is no space to do it, this being the reason for the new development) andsome LCCs can go to the new/emerged primary airport to continue growing. The Rome MAS illustratesthis case very well. Fiumicino (FCO) was built to replace Ciampino (CIA) as the main airport, after someyears empty CIA turned a secondary airport for LCCs but then most LCCs started expanding at FCO whencapacity limits were reached at CIA.It may also happen that the original primary airport gets closed and dismantled (as in Oslo or as it isplanned for Berlin). The new airport can be designed with different types of traffic in mind and thusallow space for the growth of LCCs. Or, especially when the new location becomes inconvenient for some
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travellers (as in the case of Oslo), the new primary airport can foster the (re)development of secondaryairports that mainly target LCCs.Sometimes the new primary airport does not capture any traffic at all. Montreal Mirabel Airport isperhaps the most renowned case. Examples in Europe are not uncommon though: the 1.1 billion EuroCiudad Real Airport (intended to be South Madrid Airport) opened in December 2008 and closed in2012 with less than 100 000 passengers over that period; the Region de Murcia International Airport,also in Spain, has not seen its first passenger despite construction ended in 2012; opening of BerlinBrandenburg has been severely delayed and it is not expected to happen soon.
5.3 New/emerged secondary airports (I3)The third mechanism relates to the emergence of a new, or existing but underused, secondary airportin the region served by an existing primary airport. In this case the emerging airport typically attractsmostly low-cost traffic (see Fig. 3). In many cases, secondary airports accompanied the initial expansionof LCCs and their developers provided incentives or better opportunities to capture that market (as inCharleroi, Luton, Liverpool, Bergamo, Beauvais, for instance). For start-up LCCs, these airports offereda lower cost but also lacked congestion and had simple layouts that favoured streamlined efficientoperations.
Fig. 3. Typical traffic patterns when a new or redeveloped secondary airport emerge.Emerged secondary airports can also foster the growth of LCCs at the primary airport mainly by raisingawareness of competition between airlines and between airports. Thus, as Fig. shows, low-cost trafficat the primary airport may become more important than at the secondary airport, particularly whenLCCs with a more hybrid proposition come to the primary airport. In addition, if non-LCC carriers cannotsustain competition from their low-cost counterpart, the significance of LCC traffic at the primaryairport can also increase as these airlines downsize their operations.Secondary airports may also fail to attract traffic, thus facing closure or downscaling, transferring partof their LCC traffic to primary airports (or to other secondary airports). Paris Vatry (XCR), for instance,has not been able to establish significant operations since its redevelopment. Forli Airport, in Italy, wentbankrupt in 2013 and most flights moved to Rimini and Bologna nearby. Hamburg Lubeck, filed forbankruptcy in early 2014 and ended commercial services by 2016. Beja Airport, located in betweenLisbon and the Algarve in Portugal, opened in 2011 aiming at attracting LCCs but has not attracted anyregular scheduled operator to date.
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5.4 Market dynamics (M1)The fourth mechanism involves the occurrence of market dynamics at a given primary or secondaryairport affecting either the airlines that use the airports or the airports themselves. Market dynamicsimply changes in the traffic mix of the airport system that are not directly related to changes in theinfrastructure. These include new LCC start-ups, changes in the commercial focus of a major airline(from FSC or charter to LCC, or vice versa, for instance) at the airport, or of the airport itself (due tochange in ownership or management); bankruptcy or downscaling of a major airline (de-hubbing, forinstance); and mergers or acquisitions.
Fig. 4. Typical traffic patterns after market disruptions.Fig. 4 shows the typical traffic pattern that leads to strengthened position of LCCs at an airport followingmarket-related dynamics. The overall growth of LCCs in Europe increased competition with traditional'legacy' and charter carriers, and this in turn added pressure for these airlines to control their costs and,in many cases, to restructure and concentrate their operations. For many small regional airports thismeant that LCCs were the only viable alternative to sustain traffic. Other major airports changed theirattitude towards LCCs as the airlines they were used to serve gradually (or suddenly in some cases)vanished or transformed themselves.As Fig. 4 illustrates, typically LCCs are keen to substitute the void left by 'legacy' carriers that wentbankrupt. Moreover, 'legacy' carriers may replace themselves with their in-house LCC subsidiaries tofocus on their hubs for long-haul traffic. The major independent LCCs (Ryanair, easyJet, Norwegian,Vueling before IAG acquisition, or Wizz Air, for instance) usually gain larger market shares because theyhave larger fleets and better financial positions to fund expansion.
5.5 Stages of dynamic airport evolution in relation to low-cost trafficThe different mechanisms described above normally occur in combination accelerating or increasingthe impact of low-cost traffic evolution at the airports that belong to the same airport system. Fig.illustrates the possible stages of the dynamic evolution of airport systems as a result of the identifiedmechanisms occurring in the airports.
14
Considering an initial state in which the airport system is composed of an original primary airport wherelow-cost traffic is not relevant (not necessarily a single airport. London, for instance, had Heathrow andGatwick before the development of Luton, Stansted, City and Southend), the system evolves intodifferent stages as the mechanisms trigger different traffic patterns. The stages are defined by theairports included in the system and the level of low-cost traffic in each airport.Once the airport system transitions to a new stage, market dynamics are the main mechanism throughwhich the system can reach a different stage. Alternatively, any new state can be considered as an initialstate for the future evolution of the system according to the development of the market conditions andthe regulatory environment that is uncertain. Perhaps the most likely transition from any state withmore than one airport is related to closing airports to concentrate all traffic segments in a single airport(as in Berlin, whenever the new airport opens). Likewise, the most likely transition from a stateinvolving one airport is the expansion of the airport system by developing emergent airports possiblyfocused on a given type of traffic (not necessarily low-cost, as airline business models may evolve indifferent directions in the long-term).
6 Conclusions and policy implicationsLCCs in Europe have significantly impacted both major and secondary airports. By analysing historicaltraffic and the key recent events that affected the evolution of 42 European airports, 38 of them part ofMulti-Airport Systems, this paper proposed a conceptual model to explain the dynamic evolution ofairport systems in relation to low-cost traffic. Four mechanisms normally trigger different stages of low-cost traffic development: i) Capacity expansion at primary airports; ii) New/emerged primary airports;iii) New/emerged secondary airports; and iv) Market dynamics.
Fig. 5. Conceptualisation of the dynamic evolution for airport systems in relation to low-cost traffic.
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The first three mechanisms are related to the development of physical infrastructure that encouragedthe growth of LCCs, even when not aimed directly at them. The fourth mechanism involves theoccurrence of events that affect either the airlines that use the airports or the airports themselves (e.g.bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, change of strategy focus, emergence of start-up or spin-offairlines, creation or abandonment of bases or hubs, etc.).More research is needed to conclude on the causality of the interactions between the mechanisms. Somecases suggest that infrastructure-related dynamics trigger market dynamics. In Barcelona or Alicante,for instance, the new passenger buildings provided sufficient capacity for LCCs to move and growstrongly in the primary airports. However, these two openings, particularly in Barcelona El Prat,occurred amid harsh economic times. Under such conditions, traditional carriers were alreadystruggling to provide service, let alone to expand, and airports were eager to start repaying theirinvestments. Common ownership of most Spanish commercial airports hinders this analysis in the sensethat market dynamics could have been different should the management of every airport in the MAS beable to respond independently.This paper contributes a dynamic perspective that is usually missing in existing analysis on the impactLCCs have had at European airports. Understanding the dynamics that impact the evolution of airportsystems is paramount in forecasting uncertain future traffic levels in an industry with strong variabilitydue to LCC entrance and withdrawal. Our findings highlight the need for a new paradigm in airportstrategic development that incorporates the planning and design of infrastructure, along with thedefinition of a corresponding business strategy. Encompassing infrastructure and business plans,airport planners and managers can aim at ensuring long-term sustainability.Moreover, understanding the dynamics that we identified and the interaction between them may provevaluable for policy making. As some European regions keep promoting the development of airtransportation as a means to foster local economies, it is crucial to understand that infrastructureprovision alone cannot guarantee a desired outcome. Moreover, infrastructure developments in oneairport may greatly influence the evolution of traffic (and jobs, tourism and commercial opportunities)in other airports, even when airport competition is not explicitly considered. This points out to theimportance of considering uncertainty in airport strategic planning, as infrastructure may becomeavailable under conditions that are radically different than those initially foreseen.
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Annex A – Summary of the multiple-case study: Major events at sampled airports over the period
of study (2004 - 2013)
MAS Airport Infrastructure dynamics Market dynamics
Alicante
ALC
2007 – New passenger building T2 opened
2011 – New passenger building TN opened (declared
capacity 20 million annual passengers)
2002 – easyJet acquired Go (British Airways LCC spin-off)
and became major airline at ALC
2007 – Ryanair started operations and opened a base
2009 – Decline in total passengers due to economic
downturn
2011 – 2012 – Legal dispute between Ryanair and AENA
over the use of jet bridges (-1 million passengers for
Ryanair in 2012 vs. 2011)
2012 – 2013 – Dispute settled (+0,3 million passengers for
Ryanair in 2013 vs. 2012)
2013 – Iberia abandons ALC. Replaces services with Iberia
Express then with Air Nostrum
MJV
2004 – Passenger building expansion
2006 – Passenger building expansion
2011 – New runway opened exclusively for military
operations
2007 – Ryanair concentrated growth at ALC
2011 – Jet2.com concentrated growth at ALC
Amsterdam
AMS
2003 – New runway 18R/36L (Polderbaan) opened (mostly
for noise control considerations)
2005 - “Low-cost pier” (H/M) opened (Transavia does not
use it)
2005 – Transavia (Holland) converts from charter airline to
LCC
RTM
Expansions opportunities are limited due to lack of space
available in airport location
2005 – Transavia (Holland) converts from charter airline to
LCC
2004 – 2013 Business service to LHR and LCY changed
operator: from KLM to Air France to British Airways
and City jet
EIN
2003 – New passenger building opened (declared capacity:
1,5 million annual passengers)
2013 – Passenger building expansion opened (declared
capacity: 5 million annual passengers)
2002 – Ryanair started operations
2005 – Transavia (Holland) converts from charter airline to
LCC
2013 – Ryanair opens base
Barcelona
BCN
2003 – Expansion of passenger buildings TA and TB
2004 – New runway opened
2007 – New building to connect terminals TA and TB
opened
2008 – Expansion of passenger building TC opened
2009 – New passenger building T1 opened (declared
capacity: 55 million annual passengers). Buildings TA,
TB and TC rebranded T2. T2A closed. Vueling moved
operations to T1, all other LCCs use T2.
2004 – Vueling starts as independent LCC
2006 – Iberia transfer all flights but “airbridge” MAD – BCN
to LCC spin-off Clickair
2007 – BCN – MAD was the busiest route in the world (971
flights per week in both directions according to OAG)
2007 – Air Europa reduced services to focus on hub
development at MAD
2008 – AVE High-Speed Rail line Barcelona – Madrid
opened in February
2008 – Economic recession affected passenger numbers
2009 – Merger between Vueling and Clickair (Iberia
acquires stake at Vueling)
2010 – Ryanair opens base
2012 – Spanair (Catalonia’s FSC) goes bankrupt
2013 – IAG (British Airways + Iberia) takes over Vueling
entirely
GRO
(No major expansions during the analysis period) 2002 – Ryanair enters the Spanish market with services at
GRO
2004 – Ryanair opens base
2011 – Ryanair downsizes base
REU
2005 – New arrivals building
2008 – New “check-in building” connecting arrivals and
departures buildings
2009 – Apron expansion for new aircraft stands
2010 – New boarding area
2008 – Ryanair opens base
2011 – Ryanair closes base
Brussels
BRU
2007 – Plan to develop “low-cost pier” announced
2011 – Plan to develop “low-cost pier” abandonned
2001 – Sabena went bankrupt ((became SN Brussels)
2006 – SN Brussels and LCC Virgin Express merge to form
Brussels Airlines
CRL
2008 – New passenger building and apron extension
opened (declared capacity: 5 million annual
passengers)
1997 – Charleroi becomes one of the first four Ryanair
destinations in continental Europe
2001 – Ryanair opens its firs base in continental Europe
following an agreement with the Walloon
government
2004 – WizzAir start services
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MAS Airport Infrastructure dynamics Market dynamics
Copenhagen
CPH
2010 - CPH Go “low-cost terminal” (a pier within a terminal
actually) opened (Norwegian does not use it)
2008 – Sterling Airlines went bankrupt and Norwegian
established a major base
2012 – Cimber (Air/Sterling) went bankrupt
MMX (No major developments) 2007 – 2011 – Ryanair suspended all services
Glasgow
GLA
2004 – New passenger building “Terminal 2” opened
(departures-only)
2008 – Major expansion of “Terminal 1” opened
(No major events)
EDI
2006 – New “South East pier” opened (6 boarding gates)
2010 – New departure lounge in main passenger buildings
2013 – Terminal expansion and tram line to the airport
started construction (opened in 2014)
2012 – BAA was forced to sell out EDI. Acquired by GIP,
owners of London Gatwick and London City at the
moment
PIK
2005 – Passenger building refurbished - Sold to private investors in the 1980’s
1994 – Airport railway station opened
1994 – Ryanair start services
2013 – Airport acquired by Socttish government from
private owners that were considering closing it.
Ryanair, the only passenger airline reduced services
but uses the airport as a major maintenance base
Istanbul
IST
2000 – New passenger building - International terminal
(declared capacity: 20 million annual passengers)
2010 - “International terminal” expansion opened (new
declared capacity: 45,5 million annual passengers)
2004 – 2013 – Turkish airlines tripled seats offer at IST
2005 – Airport concessioned to TAV
SAW
2001 – New (greenfield) airport opened (declared capacity:
3,5 million annual passengers)
2009 – New passenger building and apron (declared
capacity: 25 million annual passengers)
2005 – Pegasus airlines converts to LCC and adopted SAW
as its main base
2008 – 20-year airport concession to ISG started




2005 – Eastern extension of Terminal 1
2006 – A380 pier at Terminal 3
2008 – New passenger building and air-side and land-side
infrastructure (Terminal 5)
2014 – New Terminal 2
2012 – IAG (Bristish Airways + Iberia) acquired bmi and
integrated it into British Airways. Bmi regional was
sold and bmi baby (the low-cost subsidiary was
closed down)
LGW
2005 – New “Pier 6” 2002 – easyJet opens base
2008 – easyJet acquired GB Airways
2009 – BAA is forced to sell the airport, acquired by GIP
2010 – New “airport strategy” with stronger focus on LCC
along with long-haul traffic
2013 – easyJet acquired all of Flybe slots at LGW
STN
1991 – New passenger building and overall airport
redevelopment with railway station and satellite
terminals connected with an automated people
mover (estimated capacity: 35 million annual
passengers)
2008 – Expansion and renovation of the arrivals area in the
main passenger building
1991 – Ryanair started services
1997 – Ryanair transfers its main London base from Luton
to start expansion in continental Europe
2002 – easyJet acquired Go (British Airways LCC spin-off)
and gained a base at the airport
2008 – Dispute between Ryanair and BAA over airport
charges
2013 – BAA forced to sell STN, acquired by Manchester
Airports Group
2013 – Manchester Airports Group signs individual
agreements with Ryanair and easyJet
LCY
(No major expansions) 2013 – easyJet acquired all of Flybe slots at LGW. Flybe
moved to LCY from 2014. LCY is owned by GIP, same
owner of LGW
LTN
1992 – 1996 – Major renewal of airport infrastructure
1999 – New passenger building and railway station (1,8 km
from the terminal)
2005 – Passenger building expanded and renovated
1986 – Ryanair started services
1995 – easyJet is created with headquarters in Luton
1998 – Luton Borough Council granted a 30-year
concession the airport to a private consortium
(WizzAir has made Luton one of its major airports without
being a formal base)
SEN
2011 – New control tower and railway station
2012 – New passenger building and runway extension
2014 – Passenger building expansion
2008 – Sobart Group acquired the airport
2012 – easyJet opens base
2012 – Stobart Air (partly owned by airport owner) starts
services (first on behalf of Aer Lingus then of Flybe)
Manchester MAN
2001 – New runway opened
2004 – New railway station opened
2009 – Improvements across the three terminals
2012 – bmi caquired by IAG and integrated it into British
Airways
2008 – easyJet acquired GB Airways
2011 – Ryanair opens base
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LPL
2002 – New passenger building opened 1997 – easyJet opens its second base after Luton
2004 – Ryanair opens base
LBA
(No major developments) 2003 – Jet2.com is created as a spin-off from freight and
charter carrier Channel Express
2007 – Airport privatised
2010 – Ryanair opens base
Milan
MXP
1998 – New passenger building “Terminal 1” opened, part
of “Malpensa 2000” plan for a hub in the region
2013 – New satellite terminal for Terminal 1
1998 – Alitalia established main hub at MXP
2005 – easyJet starts services
2006 – “Terminal 2” dedicated as “low-cost terminal” and
easyJet opens base. The airline is the sole user of
“Terminal 2” and the largest airline at MXP since
Alitalia’s dehubbing
2008 – Alitalia moved its main hub back to Rome Fiumicino
2009 – 2011 Lufthansa created “Lufthansa Italy” with a hub
at MXP. The subsidiary transferred back operations
to the parent airline in October 2011
LIN
(No major expansions) The airport was due to reduce its services (all but a shuttle
service to Rome) after MXP renovation in 1998. This
downscaling was never realised.
BGY
2005 – Parking lot expansion and aviation equipment
improved
2007 – Refurbishment of check-in area and baggage
handling system
2009 – Extension and renewal of departures area
2010 – Passenger building expansion increasing boarding
gates and commercial space air-side
2002 – Ryanair started services
2003 – Ryanair opens base (by 2013 it was the largest base
in continental Europe)




1998 – New (greenfield) airport opened (old Oslo Airport
Fornebu closed and was dismantled)
2012 - “Pier South” opened (intended as a temporary
extension whilst work progress on a major expansion)
Largest base for Norwegian
RYG
2007 – Airport redevelopment (from former exclusive
military use) opened (declared capacity: 2 million
annual passengers
2008 – Norwegian opens base, closed in 2012. Services
moved to TRF
2010 – Ryanair opens base
2016 – Airport closed to civilian use after Ryanair closed
the based and moved back to TRF
TRF 2003 – New international terminal opened 1997 – Ryanair started services. Moved partly to RYG in2010
Paris
CDG
2003 – Passenger building Terminal 2E opened (part of its
boarding dock collapsed and reopened in 20008)
2007 – Automated People Mover (CDGVAL) opened
(connects main passenger buildings except 2G)
2007 – Satellite 3 of Terminal 2E (Hall L) opened
2008 – Terminal 2G dedicated to regional flights in small
aircraft opened
2009 – Terminal 1 renovation
2012 – Connecting building between Terminal 2A and
Terminal 2C opened
2012 – Satellite 4 of Terminal 2E (Hall M) opened
Terminal 3 is referred as “low-cost terminal”. It is used
mainly by charters and small LCCs. easyJet, the
largest LCC at CDG (sixth largest base for the carrier)
uses other terminal.
ORY
2006 – Renovation of Hall 2 in Terminal Ouest (West)
2007 – 2008 – Renovation of Terminal Sud (South)
2013 – RATP tram line T7 opens connecting the airport to
metro line 7 and suburbs in South Paris
2007 – Transavia France (Air France LCC spin-off and sister
company of Transavia Holland) starts operations
based at ORY
BVA
2010 – Passenger building “Terminal 2” opened 1997 – Ryanair start services to continental Europe after
market liberalisation, BVA was one of the initial four
destinations
(The airport is not a base for any airline)
XCR
2000 – Airport redeveloped to focus on cargo traffic




(FCO opened in the 1960’s to replace CIA, which lacked
expansion opportunities. CIA remained open for
charters and general aviation, and later LCCs)
2008 - “Terminal 5” opened (only departures to US and
Israel in some airlines)
2008 – easyJet moved all its flights from CIA to FCO
2008 – Vueling starts services
2008 – Air One and Alitalia merge
2012 – Vueling opens base
2013 – Ryanair opens base
CIA
2007 – ENAC (Italian civil aviation authority) capped the
number of flights per day allowed at CIA to control
noise (100 movements/day)
2008 - easyJet moved all its flights from CIA to FCO
Ryanair is the largest user at CIA and WizzAir is the only
other airline with scheduled services
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Malaga AGP
2010 – New passenger building “Terminal 3”. “Terminal 2”
was merged with the new building and “Terminal 1”
closed
2010 – New railway station opened
2012 – New runway opened, along with apron and
taxiways
2007 – Clickair (Iberia’s LCC spin-off) opens base
2009 – Merger between Vueling and Clickair (Iberia
acquires stake at Vueling), Vueling inherits base
2010 – Ryanair opens base
2012 – Spanair (Catalonia’s FSC) goes bankrupt
2012 – Iberia ceased services at AGP
Dublin DUB
2007 – New “Pier D” (no jet bridges) for Terminal 1 (used
for all Ryanair flights)
2010 – New passenger building (Terminal 2). Ryanair, main
user at DUB, opposed this development
2009 – 2010 – Irish financial recession
(Ryanair headquarters are located in DUB, which is a
destination for the airline since its inception in 1986,
before turning LCC in 1990. Between 2004 and 2008
Ryanair became the largest carrier. By 2012
AerLingus was again the largest carrier after Ryanair
reduced service in opposition to the new Terminal 2)
Madrid MAD
1998 – 2006 “Plan Barajas deployment”
2006 – New passenger buildings Terminal 4 and satellite
Terminal 4S, and associated aprons, taxiways and
traffic control (declared capacity of the expansion:
35 million annual passengers; of the airport: 70
million annual passengers). All LCCs (except Vueling
and Iberia Express) operate in Terminal 1-2-3
2006 – Ryanair opens base
2007 – easyJet opens base
2007 – BCN – MAD was the busiest route in the world (971
flights per week in both directions according to OAG)
2007 – Air Europa focuses on hub development at MAD
2008 – AVE High-Speed Rail line Barcelona – Madrid
opened in February
2012 – Ryanair downsize operations following airport fees
increase
2012 – Iberia creates LCC spin-off Iberia Express
2013 – easyJet closed base
Palma PMI
2003 – New passenger building “Module B” for inter-island
traffic only
(Passenger building “Module A” is used only during
summer season)
2011 – Expansion and refurbishment of “Module C”
concourse
(Air Europa headquarters are located in PMI, which is the
second largest airport for the airline.
It is also the third largest airport in Air Berlin’s network. Air
Berlin changed business model from FSC to LCC in
early 2000’s)
2007 – Ryanair started services
2012 – Ryanair opens base
